Religion and Exogamy

One of the most persistent impediments to exogamy is religion. This is true of Islam as it is of other religions, notwithstanding some significant differences. For example, according to Talmudic law and the Rabbinical code intermarriage with all gentiles, including Christians, was forbidden for the Jews. It was only in 1807 that the great Jewish Synod, convened by Napoleon, declared marriages between Israelites and Christians valid if contracted in accordance with the Civil Code.

Yet “such marriages cannot be invested with the religious forms,” that is they cannot be solemnized by the religious rites of Judaism. The Rabbinical Conference held at Brunswick, Germany, in 1844 resolved that the intermarriage of Jews and Christians or other monotheists is not forbidden, provided the parents are permitted by the state to bring up their children in the Jewish faith.

But this resolution “has been strongly criticized even by some of the most pronounced advocates of reformed Judaism. No section of Jewish opinion favors marriage between parties who are not of the same religion.” The Christians: - Constantine, later emperors, and various councils - - also prohibited intermarriages with the Jews. During the Middle Ages such marriages were universally avoided.

While St. Paul indicated that a Christian must not marry a heathen, and Tertullian called such an alliance fornication, “the Church, in early times, often even encouraged marriages of this sort as a means of propagating Christianity; and it was only when its success was beyond doubt that it actually prohibited them.”¹

The case of Islam isdifferent in some fundamental respects. The general rule is that religious homogamy takes preference as the first choice. When both parties adhere to Islam, the probability of mutual harmony is highly assuring. But it is not an absolute condition that mates be of the same religion. Muslims may intermarry with non-Muslims.

Such intermarriages are as valid and binding as “intramarriages” are. However the permission is not unqualified. No Muslim, male or female, is permitted to marry anyone who has no divine book or God-sent Prophet to follow. The Qur’an (2:221 cf., 60-10) stresses the point thus:

Do not marry idolatresses, until they believe [in God]; a believing slavegirl is surely better than an idolatress, though you may admire her. And do not marry idolaters, until they believe; verily a believing slave is better than an idolater, though you may admire him.

This injunction limits the field of non-Muslim eligibles to those who believe in God and have a divine scripture.

Another limitation is that no Muslim woman is permitted to marry anon-Muslim man. This is the unanimous resolution of Muslims from the days of the Prophet till the present time. That leaves only the possibility of religious intermarriages between Muslim men and non-Muslim women who believe in God, follow a prophet, and have a divine scripture.

These are notably Jewishand Christian women. Muslims almost unanimously allow such intermarriages. In one of the few chapters revealed toward the very end of Muhammad’s life, the Qur’an (5:5-6) says:

Today the good things are permitted to you, and the food of those who were given the Book (i.e., the Jews and the Christians) is permitted to you; and permitted to them is your food. Likewise (lawful to you are) believing chaste women in wedlock, and in wedlock chaste women of them who were given the Book before you if you give them their due dowers and desire chastity, in wedlock and not in license or as taking secret lovers.

Based on this statement, the opinion of the overwhelming majority of Muslims is that intermarriages are permitted between Muslim men and non-Muslim women if the latter believe in God and recognize the Book that was given to them before Islam.

But some “individual” jurists and also some Shi'is disagree wholly or in part with the majority’s interpretation of the statement. Malik, the father of the Maliki law school, held that such intermarriages are lawful only if they involve free women, not slave girls, because the passage of the Qur’an speaks of chaste women of the Book and freedom from slavery is a constituent of chastity; a woman who is not free is not chaste, and if she is not chaste and not a Muslim, she is not lawful to the Muslim.

A small minority of early jurists rejected the idea of intermarriages completely on the basis of their interpretation of certain statements where the Qur’an (3:118, 5:51; 12:106; 60:1) warns against the intrigues, impure beliefs, and ill feelings of the people of the Book as well as the polytheists. The Shia Imamis also disagree among themselves and with the rest of Muslims. Some of them view religious intermarriages as forbidden altogether.

They argue that disbelief in Islam is the equivalent of idolatry. Since idolatry is an absolute impediment to marriage in Islam (Q.2: 221; 60:10), it is unlawful for a Muslim to marry any one who is not like himself. Others, however, agree with the majority of Muslims on the permissibility of such intermarriages. Still, other members of this Shi‘I branch adopt an intermediate position to reconcile the conflicting interpretations.

They allow intermarriages if they are contracted on a temporary, mut'ah, basis and forbid them as permanent, continued bonds. The reconciliation of these passages and opinions is a highly technical, controversial issue which will not be discussed at this point.²

The foregoing discussion raises certain questions that need to be considered briefly. First, a distinction must be maintained between the permissibility and the advisability of intermarriages with women of the Book. For, according to the majority of Muslims, while these intermarriages are lawful in principle they may not be always advisable for practical reasons. The distinction is important to keep in mind because speaking against the advisability of the action may be misconstrued as a stand against the permissibility of that action, which of course is not necessarily the case.

Secondly, this lawfulness is established with the understanding that the man involved assumes the “instrumental leadership” in the family of procreation, where he is the protector, the head of the household, the status bearer, and the party responsible for the upbringing of the offspring in his own religious faith.

This is derived from the Qur’anic verse (4:34) in which men are described as the Qawwamun, i.e., the protectors and maintainers of women and the managers of their affairs. However, in his role as the instrumental leader, the man has no jurisdiction over the religious beliefs of his non- Muslim wife. Nor may he interfere with her freedom of worship and conscience. Islam, in Roberts’ words, “‘does not demand that these . . . women, whom a Muslim takes in marriage, should adopt [his] religion . . . , but allows them to retain their own . . ³

Thirdly, the Muslim male is permitted to intermarry with a non-Muslim female because it may serve as a gesture of good will toward non-Muslims, or as a practical implementation of the principles of Islam in concrete, though apparently “adverse,” situations of interaction.⁴

This probably reflects the Muslims’ hope that, once exposed to the true principles of Islam in a favorable encounter, a person is very likely to become appreciative of these principles and to rectify any former misconceptions. When a non-Muslim woman marries a Muslim, who is enjoined to honor and cherish her, respect her rights and whole-heartedly acknowledge her religious freedom as well as her Scriptures and prophets, it may be expected that she will somehow reciprocate.

By her increasing knowledge of Islam and experience of daily living with such a Muslim partner, she may adopt his faith or discover that it is not, in fact, a renunciation but rather an enrichment of her own. Whether or not she does so, she is legally well protected against coercion or pressure of any kind and loses none of the rights due to her in a marriage to one of her coreligionists.⁵

It is conceivable, however, that other explanations could be entertained, at least theoretically. One might say that this permission was actually designed as an indirect form of pressure to enlarge the following of Islam. A non-Muslim wife may find herself isolated or helpless in a household headed by a Muslim and thus feel pressured to give up her faith for his. Or, it can be said that such a law was a shrewd foresight on Islam’s part, introduced in anticipation of pluralistic future societies, or in preparation for any possible demographic imbalance.

Other notions may be entertained, such as sexual exploitation, male superordination, humiliation of the non- Muslims, etc. But all such suggestions hardly seem to echo even the lowest tone, or fit in the context, of the Qur’anic passage (5:5-6) where the provision is stated. Besides, this type of intermarriage is voluntary for both parties, and the non-Muslim females are portrayed in the same light as their Muslim counterparts, with equal emphasis on chastity, eligibility for and receipt of dowers, the sanctity of wedlock, and the condemnation of license.

Finally, the prohibition of intermarriage between a Muslim woman and a non-Muslim man has always been maintained by the religio-legal authorities. An explanation of this position may be attempted in the following way. It seems that such intermarriages, if permitted, would be considered by Muslims impractical and disadvantageous to the women involved as well as to their coreligionists.

A Muslim wife of a hypothetical non-Muslim husband is not believed to have the same assurances of religious freedom and personal rights as does her counterpart with a Muslim spouse. The principle of “reciprocity” is not fully implemented; while the Muslim woman does acknowledge and honor the religion of her hypothetical husband as an integral part of her own faith, he does not reciprocate.

She accepts Moses, Jesus, and all the authentic messengers of God, even as she accepts Muhammad. She makes no discrimination between them, nor is she prejudiced against any of them. When she hears the name of Moses or Jesus, or when reference is made to their Scriptures, she may only respond with reverence and homage; that is an essential aspect of her being a Muslim.

To accept Islam means a committed affirmation of the previous divine messages and an unreserved honoring of all the messengers of God. This is something she must do and delights in doing as a Muslim.

But is there any reciprocity on her mate’s part? Does he accept and honor her religion as she does his? If he does so, then he— for most practical purposes—may be regarded as a Muslim.

In this case, their intermarriage may have some ground for legality. But if he does not do so, at least four logical alternatives present themselves:

(1) the Muslim woman may lose her “most valuable” asset, i.e., faith, and renegade; (2) she may experience unnecessary tensions and mental conflicts from which the non-Muslim man is not totally immune; (3) the marriage may break up; (4) both partners may gradually grow skeptical, or simply become “liberal” and indifferent to religion altogether. Whether any of these alternatives is acceptable or advisable from a religious and societal point of view is an open

question.

Of course, love may be invoked at this junction as omnipotent, capable of solving all problems, emotional, ideological, or social. But love is perhaps one of the most abused words; and if it were so omnipotent as is sometimes claimed, social interaction would be much simpler and human life much less problematic.

Besides the relative lack of security and freedom for the Muslim woman and also the lack of reciprocity on the part of her hypothetical non-Muslim mate, there may be other reasons for the prohibition of this type of intermarriage. It seems that since Muslim authorities believe Islam to be the highest, most complete form of religion, it is forbidden for the Muslim to subject his conscience to non-Muslims and entrust them with the management of his intimate affairs.

Because the male partner is the status bearer in the family and the instrumental

leader of the household, he must be a Muslim if the wife is so; she may not be led to subordinate her spiritual status.

If he is a Muslim, the question of subordination does not usually arise, because this is a case of expected harmony and convergence of beliefs, attitudes, and practice. It would be degrading for her to intermarry with a man who does not reciprocate religiously and who, according to her belief system, is

spiritually inferior.

It is true that Islam acknowledges and incorporates the essence of all the former revelations; but Muslims believe that it has also added perfection and coverage unattained by its predecessors. It would appear exceedingly difficult, therefore, to place the Muslim woman in a position where she believes herself to be spiritually or religiously superior but must accept a partner who, in his capacity as the family head, has the authority to confer on her his own social and probably also religious status.

This is similar in a way to the cultural, not necessarily the statistical, norm of almost all known societies where it is generally accepted and expected from the female to marry above or at least on her social class level, but not below.

In an open class system, a male may descend in marriage without risking much loss of status. The case of the woman is different; even if she can “bargain” and exchange her high social status for some desirable qualities of her mate of a lower social status, faith is no object of bargaining, not according to Islam at any rate.

Muslims take their faith to be the zenith of spiritual and moral achievements; there is no higher level to long for or aspire to. Nor may a Muslim allow himself to retrogress. When a Muslim man intermarries with a non-Muslim woman, he is not descending religiously; he may even “help” his mate to “ascend” to his own religious status if he is conscientious enough and if she so desires.

However, neither he nor she will lose what they may cherish most, i.e., their private beliefs. On the other hand, if a Muslim woman intermarries with a non-Muslim man who does not wish to adopt her faith or reciprocate, she will probably have to “descend” to his level and thus lose her most valuable private asset. In an intermarriage situation, the Muslim woman will be the loser if there is no religious reciprocity, convergence, or consensus. Her very faith may be at stake, her serenity threatened, and her marriage precarious.

For these explicit and/or implicit reasons, this type of intermarriage is forbidden. This is not apparently the simple question, why can the Muslim woman not raise the religious status of her mate? Religion is the most private relationship between man and God; it cannot be imposed or conferred.' Nor is it the question of discrimination between men and women in Islam. The rights and obligations of both men and women are equal, though not necessarily identical in details.⁶

This explanation derives from ideological, psychological, and sociological factors. Yet it is, to a certain extent, inferential and even perhaps post factum. It infers from the general attitude of Islam toward other religions and of Muslims toward non-Muslims, from the intrafamily and sex differential roles, from the principles of reciprocity and cooperation in marriage, and from the historically established practice of female hypergamy.

It is one of the provisions which have been upheld with a rare unanimity. That in itself may be suggestive. The question does not seem to be that of a categorical prohibition of interreligious marriages as such; we have seen that some Muslims, specifically men, may intermarry with some non- Muslim women, though with certain reservations on the advisability thereof. Nor is it apparently a matter of an absolute prohibition of female hypagamy; we have also seen that, according to some jurists, such is unconditionally legal and, according to others, it is valid with the approval of guardians.

The “double standard” notion may conceivably enter into the situation. But this would be likely only if Muslim men’s interreligious marriages were unconditionally permissible and advisable, or if they were demonstratively more advantageous to them and less morally binding than unions with their coreligionists, or if male hypergamy was defined as a privilege and female hypergamy as a disadvantage.

Since this is not the case, the “double standard" notion is not very helpful. However, looking into the general historical realities of Muslim society, which were not always in complete conformity with the teachings of the religion, we may find some further insights.

Almost invariably, Muslim women led a secluded life behind the confines of their households. A man’s honor was measured primarily by the extent of protection, shelter, and continence he could secure for his womenfolk, especially on the consanguineal side. In fact, the word harem or harim and its derivatives denote, among other things, holiness, sacredness, man’s inviolable honor, etc.

As a result, women were generally believed to be fragile and inexperienced in the sphere of practical affairs. Their “instrumental roles” were almost always subordinate, at least technically. Men provided for them, bore full responsibility for their protection, and legislated or interpreted the existing legislations for them.

Men’s concern for their honor and protection apparently extended beyond the maiden years as it came to bear upon mate selection. A marital union between an inexperienced, fragile or naive Muslim woman and an unreciprocating, inflexible non-Muslim man must have been conceived by the law interpreters as “dangerous.”

As a rule, Muslim men would not or believed that they should not expose their womenfolk to such a risky relationship. They would be apprehensive of the responsibility, humiliation, shame, and disgrace that are bound to result in case of conversion on the women’s part. This apprehension may in part be the product of a lack of confidence in the strength of the Muslim women’s convictions, or the non-Muslim men’s characters, or both.

To protect their women from exposure to uncertainty, to avoid the risk of de-gradation or disgrace, to honor their religion by placing it outside the category of the “exchangeables” in mate selection, and to save their “honor” from being at the mercy of those who are not “trustworthy,”—these were probably the major reasons for the prohibition of intermarriage between Muslim women and non-Muslim men.

Beyond the forbidden degrees of consanguinity, affinity, milk fosterage, and religion, and so long as the prospective mates satisfy the usual conditions of marriage,⁷ a family unit can be established. Social class, race, birth or color are not serious impediments to a full-fledged, permanent union. Jurists who uphold the doctrine of “social equality” of partners as a consideration for marriage, view it only as a precaution that can be dispensed with under appropriate conditions of security, a right that may easily be waived by the woman or her marriage guardian.

It is not an absolute condition. Rather, they say, a stipulation of assurance to maximize the probability of a stable, successful union that would contribute to the uninterrupted.

REFERENCES

1. Patai, pp. 32, 35; Waf! (3 ), pp. 29 ff; Westermarck (3), pp. 57-8.

2. In addition, see ‘Abd al BaqI (4), vol. 2, p. 540; Maghniyyah (2 ), pp. 32-3; Roberts, pp. 14-5; Shaltut ( 1J), pp. 251 ff.

3. Roberts, p. 15; cf. su p ra , pp. 33 ff.

4. Cf. Shaltut (1 ), p. 253.

5. A thin thread of explanation may be found in A. Ytisuf ‘Airs commentary on al Q u r 'a n (5:6), vol. 1, p.241, n. 700. The rest is suggested independently.

6. This explanation is guided by some broad principles and derives from certain bare facts stated in the Qur’an. Foremost among these are the following: (a) The Muslims believe in what is revealed to them in the Qur’an and what has been revealed to the previous messengers of God, among whom the Muslims make no discrimination (2:136; 3:84; 43:13). (b) There should be no compulsion or coercion in religion; the truth is clear and every one must make his own religious choice (2:256; 18:29). (c) God accepts none other than the true religion of Islam (3:19, 85). (d) It is lawful to intermarry with the chaste women of the People of the Book (5:5). (e) Men are the guardians and protectors of women (4:34). If the prohibition of intermarriage between Muslim women and non-Muslim men is to be explained in the light of these principles and facts, in accordance with role differentiation, the explanation will probably follow the line suggested in the text of the discussion. The concepts “equal” and “identical” are introduced here to differentiate sex roles. Such differentiation in Islam does not mean inequality, even though it may preclude identicalness. The rights and obligations attached to a woman’s role, when taken an item for an item, do not identically correspond with those specified by a man’s role. But when allowing for the sex role differentials, weighing the overall constituents of each role, and adjusting the scale of the respective rights and obligations, it will become clear that (a) the rights and obligations of any member of a given sex balance one another in the final analysis, and (b) the role constituents of the male “equal” those of the female’s (also in the final analysis). For example, in certain cases of inheritance a woman’s share is one half a man’s. On the surface this is an injustice, or inequality, but in reality it is not necessarily the case. What is seen here is that the two specific shares are not identical, i.e., not the same. Yet this does not necessarily mean inequality or inequity. Considering that the woman is not denied the fruits of anything she has earned or worked for, and that she is practically carefree (since all her basic financial needs are met by some male in her family of orientation or procreation), and realizing, on the other hand, the man’s position as the party responsible for the financial needs of his immediate family and possibly beyond, it becomes evident that the distribution of shares is based on differential needs and responsibilities. Where the man’s obligations outweigh those of the woman, he is compensated for that by additional allowances drawn from such funds as the property of a deceased relative. This extra-allowance is not based on discrimination or inequality; rather, it is in return for his additional burdens. If we take the situation in its totality, weighing the respective rights and obligations of both men and women, the end result would seem to be an equal, though not identical, distribution.

7. See su p ra , pp. 50 ff.